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Water is vital for life and plays an essential role for economic development of countries. To address 
water scarcity issues, better pricing has been recognized as an important tool. In this paper several 
empirical studies which highlight water pricing theories and related models have been reviewed. These 
theories explain different aspect of water pricing that can be used as a means to improve water use 
efficiency. Analysis of partial equilibrium can be viewed as effects of a policy on a specific sector like 
agriculture, but an analysis of general equilibrium often involves steady-state paths which is in fact a 
macro-level approach. A comparison of first best pricing with second best pricing models shows that 
the latter are possible when transaction costs are included. In the absence of storage capacities limits 
and direct costs of water, development decision studies find that the price of water held in storage must 
rise at the rate of interest and that the effect of discounting is to cause a cycle in the water price. 
Finally, recent evidence suggests that the short-run efficiency of marginal cost pricing can be extended 
to account for long-run fixed cost considerations.  
 
Key words: Water pricing, marginal value product pricing, partial equilibrium, general equilibrium, marginal cost 
pricing, average cost pricing. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Water is vital for life and plays an important role for 
economic development. In the past decades, increasing 
population, urbanization and industrial development, 
have increased demand for water which has resulted into 
considerable decrease in annual renewable water 
resources per capita. On the other hand under-pricing of 
water may convey the demander the illusion that the real 
value of water is at the low price level which the 
consumers are paying. Therefore, design of water price 
structure is a crucial issue for water utilities and local 
communities to achieve an efficient allocation of the 
scarce water resources. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
A review of the pertinent literature shows that a wide  
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range of methods for pricing water has been developed 
over time. These methods differ in information on which 
they are based, their implementation methods 
(Johansson, 2002).  
In an economically efficient resource allocation, the 
marginal benefit from use of the resource should be 
equal across user sectors in order to maximize social 
welfare (Dinar et al., 1997). According to Easter et al. 
(1997), efficient water distribution is one that which 
maximizes the total net benefit ability to be obtained 
using existing technologies and available quantities of 
that resource.  
According to Johansson (2005) under certain condi-
tions (full information, no externalities, perfect compete-
tion, complete certainty and non-increasing returns to 
scale), markets would achieve first-best allocations. 
Allocation maximizing the total net benefit is called Pareto 
efficient or first-best. When trades are free from govern-
ment constraints and high transaction costs, the resulting 
price will be equal to that determined under marginal cost 
pricing methods and the resulting water allocation will be 
Pareto efficient. Likewise, in the absence of implemen-
tation costs,  the  marginal  cost  of  supply  includes  only  
  
 
 
delivery costs and the allocation resulting from marginal 
cost pricing is Pareto efficient. 
When long-run fixed costs are considered in the 
maximization problem, Pareto efficient allocations are 
achieved and if the maximization problem include 
variable (short-run) costs only, the resulting allocations 
can be regarded as short-run efficient. The allocation is 
termed second-best efficient when maximization occurs 
under constraints like institutional, informational, or 
political constraints; (Mas-Collel et al. (1995); Johansson 
(2000)).  
According to Seagraves and Easter (1983); Dinar et al. 
(1997); Johansson (2000), equity of water distribution 
concerns with the "fairness" of distribution across time or 
economically disparate groups in a society and may not 
be appropriate with respect to efficiency purposes. For 
instance, a Rawlsian concept of fairness to investigate 
equity in India's irrigation systems is used by Sampath 
(1992). It seeks to maximize the welfare of the well-off 
minority in a society and allows one to evaluate reform 
strategies in these terms (Johansson, 2000).  
Water pricing mechanisms are generally in the national 
interest and are used to increase water available for 
certain sectors or citizens (Johansson 2000). They are 
not, however, very effective in redistributing income. 
Dinar et al. (1997) claimed that to meet this goal, it is 
often necessary to provide a subsidized water provision 
or adopt different pricing mechanisms accounting for 
disparate income levels.  
 
 
Review of water pricing 
 
In the followings, significant theories of water pricing will 
be reviewed. Also in Figure 1, the schematic of normative 
theories of irrigation water pricing adapted from 
Johansson (2002), and in Table 1, pertinent questions 
addressed by the reviewed water pricing theories and 
models will be illustrated. 
 
Partial equilibrium versus general equilibrium  
 
Johansson et al. (2002) stated that analysis of partial 
equilibrium (PE) can be viewed as effects of a policy on a 
specific sector like agriculture. Such an analysis focuses 
only on the principal agents affected by a policy. On the 
other hand an analysis of general equilibrium (GE) 
includes also other sectors or regions (sometimes across 
time) to determine the economy-wide effects of a policy. 
Moreover, an analysis of general equilibrium often 
involves steady-state paths and is in fact macro-level in 
approach. 
Assuming the rest of the economy operates in a given 
way, PE analyses focuses on one irrigation unit (farm, 
district, sector). GE analyses, however, consider other 
regions or sectors. Considering the public-good nature of 
water provision, the literature on the second best theories 
of water allocation will be mentioned. PE analysis tries to 
set the price such that the marginal cost equals the 
consumer’s marginal benefit. GE analysis, however,  exa-  
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examines the effects on other sectors of setting such a 
price. 
Berck et al. (1990) explained how computational GE 
models can be used to evaluate policies. They believed 
that in computation of direct effects of a project, the GE 
models suffer from the same limitations as a standard 
cost-benefit analysis does. However, for a large irrigation 
project, computational GE allows those endogenously 
determined variables to be estimated. 
 
 
First best pricing versus second best pricing 
 
The oldest discussion on water pricing among eco-
nomists is whether to price water by its average cost 
(based on financial reasons of cost recovery) or by its 
marginal cost (based on the economic reasoning of 
promoting an efficient use of the resource).  
Johansson et al. (2000) pointed out that an econo-
mically efficient allocation of water is one that results in 
the highest return for a given water resource. He also 
suggested that to attain this effectiveness, the price of 
water should be identical to the marginal cost of 
supplying an additional unit of water plus the shortage 
value of the resource.  
Garcia and Reynaud (2004) mentioned that maximizing 
social welfare leads a public utility to use marginal-cost 
pricing (MCP). Maximizing aggregate net surplus leads to 
the famous law of equality of price and social marginal-
cost,  
 
( )C Qp Q λ
∂
= +
∂
           (1)                                                                                      
 
where,  denotes marginal shadow price of water and Q 
stands for the volume produced by a water utility. The 
shadow price is positive when water withdrawals have 
environmental impacts, or when water is scarce. 
They argued that due to a number of criticisms against 
marginal cost pricing (First-best water pricing), the 
“revenue-recovery principle” has played the primary rule 
in design of water prices and thus, the price usually used 
by water utilities corresponds to average cost pricing 
(Second-best water pricing). This is shown by the 
following equation;  
 
( )C Qp Q
∂
=
∂
       (2)                                                                                        
 
They also pointed out that in a second-best world 
where the budget of a water utility must be balanced, an 
alternative to average cost pricing is “Ramsey–Boiteux” 
pricing. Under a budget constraint, it ensures a maximal 
economic welfare. The equation below shows this fact:  
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Figure 1. Schematic of normative theories of irrigation water pricing. 
  
 
 
where,  denotes the price elasticity of the water demand 
and the term /(1+) reflects the cost of the budget 
constraint. Carrying out this pricing, however, requires a 
perfect knowledge of marginal-cost and price elasticity.  
Smith and Tsur (1997) used mechanism design theory 
to propose a mechanism to price irrigation water when 
farmers are heterogeneous in their production techno-
logies and their individual water uses are unobserved. 
They found that the second-best allocations are possible 
when transaction costs are contained, but not the first-
best allocations. They also suggested that when imple-
mentation is free from transaction costs, this mechanism 
achieves first-best allocations.  
One accepted way for determining tariffs in water 
sector is to recover the partial or full cost of irrigation 
services. This approach is called cost-of-service 
approach (self- finance) and is of an equitable economic 
appeal for public utility rates (electricity, gas and railway, 
road, or irrigation charges). In this method, interpreted to 
mean average rather than marginal costs, users should 
be charged only an amount sufficient to recover the 
outlay incurred in providing the service.  
Marginal cost changes according to irrigation decisions 
which are functions of geographical conditions and sea-
sonal differences. This fact requires that different prices 
to be charged at different times. Likewise, the marginal 
cost to society of delivering one unit of water to a farmer 
at tail end may be higher than that of the same unit of 
water to a farmer nearer to the source of water supply.  
An advantage of marginal cost pricing is that it is 
theoretically efficient and the most important result from 
the existing water pricing literature is that efficiency calls 
for marginal cost pricing. Monteiro (2005) pointed out that 
pure marginal cost pricing, because of financial fairness 
(with fairness worry that marginal cost pricing could 
impose an undue burden on the poorest), may not be 
possible or even desirable.  
The marginal cost pricing improves the economic effi-
ciency in allocation of irrigation water when prices in 
other private/public sectors are set at the marginal costs 
of production.  
Lewis (1969) cited by Sahibzada (2002) indicates that 
from the viewpoint of promoting the efficient use of water 
resources, water charges should be set at marginal costs 
or the equilibrium price, whichever is the lower. But Small 
and Carruthers (1991) indicated that whenever a capacity 
restriction exists, the price should be raised above 
marginal cost to a point where quantity demanded equals 
available supply exactly; when, however, an excess  
capacity exists, the price of irrigation water should equal 
the marginal cost for providing.  
According to Johansson (2000), marginal cost pricing 
equates price with the marginal cost of supplying the last 
unit of water and to equate marginal benefits of  an  addi- 
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Table 1. Pertinent questions addressed by the reviewed water pricing models. 
 
 
Pertinent questions Related articles 
1 First best pricing versus second best pricing 
Tsur and Dinar (1997); Zarnikau (1994) 
Thobani (1998); Mitra (1997); Monteiro (2005); 
Lewis (1969); Sahibzada (2002); Johansson 
(2000); Dandy et al. (1984); Riordan (1971b); 
Garcia and Reynaud (2004); Small and 
Carruthers (1991); Mas-Collel et al. (1995). 
2 Partial equilibrium versus general equilibrium  Johansson et al. (2002) for PE. Berck et al. (1990) for GE. 
3 Efficiency and fairness concerns 
Lewis (1969); Seagraves and Easter (1983); 
Saliba and Bush (1987); Sampath (1991 and 
1992); Easter (1997); Small and Rimal (1996); 
Dinar et al. (1997); Johansson (2000 and 2002). 
4 Temporal or seasonal rates 
Gysi and Loucks (1971); Zarnikau (1994); Dinar 
et al. (1997); Sahibzada (2002); Schuck and 
Green (2002); Monteiro (2005). 
5 Development decisions or capacity restrictions  Riordan (1971b); Manning and Gallagher (1982); Riley and Scherer (1979). 
6 Scarcity  
Moncur and Pollock (1987); Einaboulsi (2001); 
Griffin (2001); Zilberman (1997); Shah et al. 
(1995); Easter (1997); Sahibzada (2002); 
Seagraves and Easter (1983); Monteiro (2005); 
Sunding (1994); Small and Rimal (1996); Laffont 
and Tirole (1993). 
7 Marginal value product pricing  Sahibzada (2002); Sunding (2005). Hussain et al. (2007). 
8 Storage Riley and Scherer (1979). 
9 Hedonic pricing model or implicit marginal price  
Latinopoulos et al. (2004); Torell et al. (1990); 
Faux and Perry (1999); Coelli et al. (1991); 
Griffin(1985). 
 
 
 
tional unit of irrigation water to its additional supply cost 
(a special case of volumetric pricing). However, water 
supply costs include items such as corresponding to 
maintenance (Easter, 1987) and collection of water and 
the relevant fees (Small and Carruthers, 1991), social 
cost (benefit), scarcity, infrastructure, extraction cost 
externalities (Johansson, 2000).  
Basically, a resource is considered to be used 
efficiently if the cost of obtaining the resource (including 
the opportunity cost of the foregoing other alternative 
uses) is the same as the benefit society makes from 
consuming its last or marginal unit. If the price of the 
resource equals its marginal cost, the consumer can 
compare with the benefits they obtain the costs they 
undergo due to their consumption decisions. If the unit 
price differs from marginal cost, consumption levels are 
either too low (for prices above marginal costs) or too 
high (for prices below marginal costs) in relation to the 
socially optimum level of consumption (Monteiro, 2005).  
Spulber and Sabbaghi (1994) discussed four defini-
tional problems associated with marginal cost pricing. For 
instance, (i) due to water quantity, quality and location, 
the marginal cost is multi-dimensional in nature; (ii) it 
varies depending on whether a demand increment is 
temporary or permanent (due to the composition of fixed 
and variable costs as determined by short and long-term 
demands); (iii) it varies with the period over which it is 
measured, that is, short-run vs. long-run marginal cost 
and (iv) marginal cost pricing tends to neglect equity 
issues. Within the periods of shortage or scarcity, if prices 
increase to the needed level, groups with lower income 
may be negatively affected.  
Riordan (1971a) found that multistage marginal cost 
pricing is able to provide a 10 to 20% increase in the total 
net benefits. Dandy et al. (1984) analyzed a constrained 
water pricing method and found that such a method, 
while being less efficient than the optimal water pricing 
derived in their model, is still able to increase benefits to 
society when compared to actual average cost pricing 
practices.  
The spot-market pricing system developed by Zarnikau 
(1994) provides a model of pricing for water (short-run 
marginal cost pricing) that may provide some guidance 
towards effective water utility planning  strategies  and  in  
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the design of more economically efficient water strategies 
to rationing water in times of drought or scarcity. This 
system of water pricing would also provide information 
regarding customers’ evaluation of system enhance-
ments or capacity increases, through the amounts they 
actually pay when capacity constraints are binding. Short-
run marginal costs must include, besides operating costs, 
the costs imposed by capacity constraints or by the 
scarcity of water resources, to ration the available water 
towards the uses of highest value. 
 Mitra (1997) cited by Sahibzada (2002) stated that 
setting the price of a product equal to incremental costs 
associated with incremental production is a marginal cost  
pricing. From an economic theory viewpoint, she also 
indicates that when marginal cost is ceaselessly falling 
with the size of the unit due to economies of scale, it will 
remain below the average cost throughout and any price 
based on marginal cost will not recover the full average 
cost, thus necessitating subsidization.  
According to economic theory, when the marginal cost 
falls below average cost, the revenue generated by 
marginal cost pricing may not be enough to recover the 
costs leading to financial losses by the water company. 
On the other hand if marginal costs rise above average 
costs, excessive profits made through monopoly supply 
of what is perceived to be an essential good may not be 
acceptable to the public opinion or legal standards. 
However, in cases where the costs for water treatment 
and delivery per unit declines as a result from increases 
in the number users, marginal cost pricing will not recover 
full costs since the marginal cost will always be lower 
than the average cost. 
 
 
Efficiency and fairness concerns 
 
Efficiency is a word often used in, for example, economic 
considerations. However, the word must be defined 
explicitly for each use since one kind of efficiency may be 
achieved at the expense of another. The most common 
use of efficiency is in economic efficiency where refers to 
the quantity of goods or services obtained per consumer 
cost (Samuelson, 1976). There are many ways to 
describe efficiency in water allocation. Johansson et al. 
(2002) indicated that an efficient allocation of water 
resources is one that maximizes net benefits to society, 
using existing technologies and water supplies. Dinar et 
al. (1997) explained that, in the short run, an efficient 
allocation maximizes the net benefits from variable costs 
and results in equalization of marginal benefits from use 
of the resource across sectors which can lead to maxi-
mization of social welfare. They stated that in the long 
run, maximization of net benefits also includes optimal 
choices of fixed inputs. 
As mentioned above, Lewis (1969) mentioned out that 
from viewpoint of promoting the efficient use of water 
resources, water rates should be set at  marginal  cost  or  
 
 
 
 
the equilibrium price, whichever is the lower. According to 
Accounting, Business, Studies and Economics Dic-
tionary, private efficiency is where a person’s marginal 
benefit from a given activity equals their marginal cost.  
Private efficiency is achieved where marginal private 
benefit equals marginal private cost (MC = MB). How-
ever, social efficiency is a situation of Pareto optimality 
where it’s impossible to make anyone better off without 
making someone else worse off. Social efficiency is 
achieved where marginal social benefit equals marginal 
social cost (MSC = MSB). Consequently, price efficiency 
means that productivity of a factor (for example water) 
rises as the factor rate increases.  
Seagraves and Easter (1983) showed that fairness 
concerns include items such as recovery of costs from 
users, subsidized food production and income real-
cation. Moreover, Small and Rimal (1996) showed some 
tradeoffs between equity and efficiency. They simulated 
effects of alternative water distribution rules on equity and 
efficiency for typical Asian irrigation systems.  
Considerations of income allocation are sometimes 
used to justify departure from efficient allocations and 
equity or social awareness (Johansson, 2000). Propo-
nents of this idea believe that consumers benefit from 
agricultural investments through lower food prices and 
so, should be expected to share in recovering the costs 
(Sampath, 1992). By the way, fairness concerns regard-
ing irrigated agriculture are also important when 
addressing international aid and development issues. He 
stated that fairness concerns regarding income reallo-
cation via irrigation allocation have become one of the 
major objectives across various disciplines.  
Krueger et al. (1991) indicated that subsidized 
inputs/outputs (e.g. water) inflict domestic social costs, 
alter production decisions and adversely affects interna-
tional trade. They believed that if governments were to 
support farmers, they should find tactful ways to do so. 
 
 
Temporal or seasonal rates 
 
Water demand and its production cost are changing over 
time and thus water authorities set various prices for 
different seasons. In summer, when weather is warm and 
dry, consumers’ water demand increases and water 
authorities use higher prices to encourage consumers to 
decrease their water consumption. Using various rates in 
summer is the most effective method in comparison with 
the use of maximum rate in this season. While various 
seasonal prices reflect seasonal change of parsimony 
costs, rates could be strong motive for conservation, 
economical return and equality.  
Gysi and Loucks (1971), Riordan (1971a) and Monteiro 
(2005) argued about the investment-pricing decisions by 
considering block rate water tariffs and seasonal 
variations in the prices. They separated nonlinear de-
mand functions for five residential  sectors.  Their  results  
  
 
 
indicated the advantages of an increasing block rate 
schedule combined with a summer price differential. 
As mentioned earlier, Zarnikau (1994) developed a 
model of spot market pricing for charges that vary with 
location and time (including different times in a day). 
Consumers are expected to respond to time-of-day 
pricing or spot market pricing by changing their con-
sumption from periods with higher prices to periods with 
lower prices. Schuck and Green (2002) extended a 
supply-based water pricing model (model of water pricing 
able to reflect in price of water changes in water supply) 
in which they considered the revenue restrictions of water 
providing  
agencies. The model combines the techniques of con-
junctive use system management with and the second-
best (Ramsey) water pricing. They assessed the impact 
of the pricing policy on water, energy and land use, by 
applying simulation techniques to a water using district in 
California. Their results indicate that the adoption of the 
supply-based pricing policy reduces water demand and 
energy use and increases fallowing (leaving the land 
uncultivated) in periods of drought, adjusting agricultural 
activities to the water supply of each period.  
According to Dinar et al. (1997) and Sahibzade (2002) 
water for irrigation in France is generally sold on binomial 
tariff basis. This system accounts for off-peak and on-
peak costs. A peak period is identified lasting for five 
months from mid-May to mid-September and that it plays 
a central role in determination of tariff. Tariff design is 
based on the objective that tariffs should reflect, (i) in the 
off-peak period, marginal operating costs; (ii) in the peak 
period, long run marginal capital costs plus marginal 
operating costs and (iii) possible discharge reduction in 
the form of pollution fees.  
Finally, Monteiro (2005) suggests that the development 
of this kind of seasonal water pricing methods must take 
explicitly into account the possibility of water storage. 
 
 
Development decisions or capacity restrictions 
 
In his seminal article, Monteiro (2005) pointed out that 
determination of water price when facing capacity 
restrictions has been an issue of research for both water 
supply and other public utilities like electric power supply 
for which such decisions are generally studied together 
with the decisions to expand the system. Additionally, he 
found that peak-load pricing may postpone investment in 
system development in comparison with other more 
inefficient pricing schemes. 
 According to Riordan (1971a), a model of optimal 
water pricing and investment by regulated monopoly or a 
publicly owned utility, called multistage marginal cost 
pricing, is based on a short-run marginal cost pricing rule. 
He also developed a general model of investment-pricing 
decisions to the particular problem of choosing the timing 
and sizes of additions to capacity in  urban  water  supply  
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systems. On the basis of empirical data, typical but 
hypothetical cost and demand curves for water supply 
are defined and incorporated into the model. He advised 
dynamic programming techniques for optimal capacity 
extensions and their suitable timing for urban water 
supply treatment facilities (Riordan, 1971b).  
For cases in which both supply and demand are 
disharmonic and seasonal, Riley and Scherer (1979) 
used a peak-load pricing for water. Three years later, 
Manning and Gallagher (1982) extended the model 
above and found that in the absence of storage capacity 
limits and direct costs of water, the price of water held in 
storage must rise at the rate of interest and that the effect 
of discounting is to cause a cycle in price of water. They 
observed that the Hotelling lemma regarding for the 
optimal price of an exhaustible resource available in a 
fixed quantity is just a limiting case of the kind of storage 
period and with no limit on the ability of storage capacity 
to carry this quantity over to the following periods. 
 
 
Scarcity 
 
According to Monteiro (2005), scarcity is a more recent 
apprehension than capacity restrictions, reflecting the fact 
that the common approach in rising water demand in the 
past was to extend the water supply system.  
There are many ways that pricing mechanisms can be 
used to address scarce resources. Seagraves and Easter 
(1983) indicated that during seasonal shortages, higher 
marginal cost prices should be applied in order to recover 
fixed costs to ration all of the water during peak demand. 
In 2000, Johansson pointed out that many informal 
allocation systems had developed in the absence of 
prices or formal markets to address the scarcity. For 
example, Pakistan and India have been using the 
Warabandi system. Bali and Cape Verde have been 
using the Subaki system and the Entornador-Entornador 
system respectively.  
Moncur and Pollock (1987) studied the problem of 
determining the scarcity rent of water. They used a non-
renewable resource efficient extraction model to deter-
mine the rareness value and the price efficient path in the 
future. They calculated the rareness value by con-
sidering the future increase in costs originated from the 
necessity to use costly backstop technologies to satisfy 
water demand. They found that efficient price would have 
to be equal to marginal cost and that marginal cost 
should include not only accounting costs but also 
opportunity costs reflected in the scarcity rent for water.  
Sunding (1994) cited by Johansson (2005) investigated 
the alternative supply reduction strategies for environ-
mental improvement in a multi-dimensional system. They 
unified certain models to provide a holistic evaluation of 
environmental protection policies affecting California's 
Bay/Delta region. These models showed that increasing 
water costs (irrigation reduction in channel  which  diverts  
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water) and labor distortions due to environmental legis-
lation can be mitigated through water trading. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993), Johansson et al. (2002) 
proposed to recover scarcity costs with another 
mechanism which is a set of fixed charges to balance the 
budget. They stated that the short-run efficiency of 
marginal cost pricing can be extended to account for 
long-run fixed cost considerations.  
Small and Rimal (1996) and Johansson (2005), utilizing 
efficiency and fairness criteria evaluated water scarcity 
effects on irrigation system performance in Asia. They 
noted that optimal conveyance strategies to account for 
scarcity may reduce economic efficiency and equity 
marginally.  
Easter et al. (1997) investigated inter temporal allo-
cations under scarcity and uncertain supply (which it may 
also be related to the choice of water source and 
irrigation system) which will affect the eventual water 
price.  
In 2001, Griffin suggested a tariff structure for water 
that aims both at efficiency and revenue neutrality of 
water utility. He showed that water price should also 
include opportunity costs such as, user’s marginal cost of 
water (to take into account sacrifice of future uses of 
unrenowned groundwater supplies); marginal value of 
raw water (surface water and fully renewable ground 
water sources, in scarcity situations); marginal capacity 
cost (when water supplied with capacity installed is less 
than water demand). 
 
 
Hedonic pricing model or implicit marginal price 
 
The hedonic valuation technique is used to disaggregate 
the sale price of a bundled good (that is, land charac-
teristics) to reveal part of it corresponding to water to be 
able to analyze market for a distinguished good 
(Latinopoulos et al., 2004). They utilized that technique to 
reveal the implicit value of irrigation water by analyzing 
agricultural land values in Chalkidiki, a typical rural area 
in Greece that is suffering from a severe problem of 
irrigation water shortage. Subsequently, they used a 
sample of both nonirrigated and irrigated characteristics 
and estimated the value of irrigation water through 
disaggregating the total price of each area of land 
obtained by a local survey. Results show that, apart from 
attributes of typical values, the agricultural characteristics 
of lands, including irrigation water availability, have an 
important influence on the land prices.  
The hedonic pricing method has been used regularly in 
the analysis of land prices. Most agricultural economists 
have studied the balance between agricultural produc-
tivity and residential demand on the urban and rural 
fringes. This approach is also used to measure the 
contribution of water value to farm prices. Torell et al. 
(1990) estimated water value in the Ogallala Aquifer. 
Likewise,   Faux   and  Perry  (1999)  obtained  the  water 
 
 
 
 
value in Oregon, Malheur county.  
Coelli et al. (1991) formulated a hedonic model of farm 
land values. This method was used for cost benefit 
analysis of a public water supply scheme. They showed 
that the benefits of scheme water are considerably less 
than its costs.  
 
 
Marginal value product pricing  
 
In 2002, Sahibzada noted that the water rate determi-
nation principle often favored by economists is to base 
charges on the value of service, that is, on the marginal 
product value of water which equals, at equilibrium, the 
price farmers are willing to pay for water.  
Three methods of estimating the marginal product 
value of water include, (i) The residual imputation which 
deducts from gross product value the costs of inputs 
other than water and then, attributes the whole of the 
remainder to the water input, (ii) The linear programming 
technique which is well suited to estimate the marginal 
value of water; (iii) The production function technique 
which is used to derive the marginal product value of 
water. Cross-sectional, time series and Panel Data are  
often used for estimating the value of inputs in crop 
production. Conradie and Hoag (2002) indicated three 
alternatives to residual imputation: 
 
 “The first estimates a crop-water production function 
from field trials and then scales this physical production 
function by the price of the product (Colby, 1989); 
(Penzhorn and Marais, 1998). The second approach is to 
estimate a demand function directly from water price 
data. Griffin (1985) presented an econometric model 
using panel data of irrigation prices in Texas. The third 
approach is to use Hedonic pricing methods to measure 
the contribution of water value to farm prices.” 
 
Hussain et al. (2007) stated that at a farm level, the 
optimal value of water will be achieved when the value of 
marginal product equals the marginal cost of water. In 
this case, farmer’s marginal private benefit and marginal 
private cost would be equal.  
According to Sunding (2005), if the corresponding 
production function is differentiable, optimal water use 
per acre with crop i at district j will be at a level where the 
value of marginal product of water equals the shadow 
price of water. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Pricing based on first best pricing is a widely accepted 
pattern for recovering partial or full cost of the irrigation 
services. According to Sahibzada (2002), it is called the 
cost of service approach in which public utility rates has 
both   an   economic   and   an  equitable  appeal.  In  this  
  
 
 
approach farmers should be charged only a quantity 
sufficient to cover the outlay incurred in providing the 
service. There are two variants of this approach: 1) 
Charging rates which cover only current operation and 
maintenance costs and is considered as partial cost 
recovery or the rock bottom variant. 2) Full cost recovery 
insists on charges which not only cover maintenance but 
also yield a depreciation allowance and some net return 
on the historical capital costs of the irrigation channel 
(Sahibzada, 2002).  
Sahibzada (2002) also illustrated that average cost 
pricing involve inefficiencies in water use. Lewis (1969), 
cited by Sahibzada (2002), claimed that average cost 
pricing would means that a cultivator using an extra unit 
of water for crop production would be charged less for it 
than it costs the community to provide. He also pointed 
out that this pricing takes only the supply side into 
account and ignores the demand side and its application 
under both increasing (lead to profits) and decreasing 
(lead to subsidization) average costs leads to inefficient 
outcomes.  
On the other hand pricing based on the second best 
pricing is another criterion that is adopted for determining 
rates in the irrigation water. Marginal cost pricing sets the  
price of irrigation water equal to the marginal cost of 
providing it or incremental costs associated with 
incremental production. According to Dinar et al. (1997) a 
marginal cost pricing mechanism, targets a price for 
water to equal the marginal cost of supplying the last unit 
of that water. One of the most advantages of this pricing 
is that it is theoretically efficient. But Dinar et al. (1997) 
and Sahibzada (2002) in their studies showed that using 
of this pricing system confronts some practical problems 
such as: 1) Marginal cost alters with the nature of the 
irrigation decision with which the irrigation methods are 
concerned. 2) The marginal cost varies with the period 
over which it is measured (like seasonal differences and 
short- run vs. long-run) and space (the tail end and near 
to the source of water supply) which will require that 
different prices be charged at different times. 3) This 
method is difficult to estimate and apply in real con-
ditions. Therefore, pricing based on marginal cost would 
necessitate charging varying prices within a single 
irrigation system and also overtime. 
Another famously accepted criterion for determining 
rates in the water sector is pricing system based on value 
of marginal product of water. According to Sahibzada 
(2002), in this method, prices will be just low enough so 
that all water available is used, but just high enough so 
that no farmer wants more irrigation water at the price 
facing him. In the other word, at equilibrium, the water 
value marginal product will be equal to the price which 
farmers are willing to pay for water. On the other hand 
Shiferaw et al. (2008) pointed out where no market price 
exists, optimal allocation of irrigation water will require the 
shadow price to be equal to its marginal value product. 
According to Dinar et al. (1997) an allocation which 
equates water’s  unit  price  (the  water’s  marginal  value  
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product) with the marginal cost is considered an econo-
mically efficient, or socially optimal, allocation of water 
resources.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Water is the vital for life and is a major asset for develop-
ment of each country that squandered due to under-
pricing. The increasing water demand for increasing 
population, urbanization and industrial development has 
caused which countries to consider various mechanisms 
to improve water use efficiency. The theories, reviewed in 
this paper, explain different aspect of water pricing that 
can be used as a means to address water scarcity issues 
in terms of quantity as well as quality. The empirical 
findings reveal that the first best pricing is a widely 
accepted model for partial or full cost recovery of the 
irrigation schemes as it considers inefficiencies in water 
use. On the other hand the second best pricing model 
sets price of water equal to the marginal cost of providing 
it or incremental costs associated with incremental 
production. Most of the economists agree that if water 
users pay the marginal cost of its supply water use 
efficiency, would be significantly improved. The marginal 
product value is used to assess efficiency of inputs 
applied. In other words, a deviation of the marginal 
product value from price represents inefficient use of 
input. Finally, there exists currently a debate that while 
water pricing programs promote economically and 
environmentally efficient water use they may not always 
be appropriate as water pricing is often perceived as a 
policy intervention that negatively affects poor farmers 
and small holders. It can be concluded that all of the 
mentioned theories consider water pricing as an impor-
tant tool which policy makers can apply for management 
of this valuable resource. 
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